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LABOR LAw-LABoR-MANAGEMBNT RELATIONS Acrr-R:raHTs OF REPLACED 
"EcoNOMic" STRIKBRs UNDER SECTION 8 (a) (3)-0ne hundred and seventy 
employees of the respondent, predominantly union members, engaged in an 
"economic'' strike. Thirty of them returned during the strike; the others were 
permanently replaced. After the strike had ceased, the union asked the 
respondent if it would take back the remaining strikers as soon as possible, to 
which the respondent replied that it would rehire them when it could. About 
100 strikers then applied for employment and 73 were rehired. The remaining 
strikers caused a complaint to be filed, alleging discrimination in violation of 
section 8 (a) (3) of the amended National Labor Relations Act.1 The trial 
1Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 140, 29 U.S.C. (1952) 
§l58(a)(3): ''It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer by discrimination in 
regard to hire or tenure of employment ••• to encourage or discourage membership in any 
labor organization .••• " 
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examiner found that the statements of the respondent constituted an "agreement 
to rehire" entitling the strikers to a preferential status in hiring, the violation of 
which contravened section 8 (a) (3).2 Held, complaint dismissed. Permanent-
ly replaced economic strikers do not have a preferential status and are in the 
position of applicants for new employment. Even if the employer made an 
"agreement to rehire," this does not affect their status. The burden resting on 
the Board to prove discrimination against them was not satisfied. In re Bartlett 
Collins Co., IlO N.L.R.B. No. 58, 35 L.R.R.M. 1006 (1954). 
It was early held under the original National Labor Relations Act that if a 
strike is called against an employer who is not guilty of any act in violation of 
the statute (an economic strike), he can protect and maintain his business by 
replacing strikers with permanent employees.3 Neither in this case, nor in the 
case where for business reasons the employer has no openings due to a reduc-
tion in his working force, is he under any duty to reinstate or rehire the 
strikers.4 It has sometimes been stated that in this situation the replaced 
strikers are in the position of new job applicants, who have only the right not 
to be discriminated against for union activity.5 This proposition is not com-
pletely accurate however. It is true that replaced strikers must apply for work 
and be refused before they may allege discrimination, 6 and that their applica-
tions must be understood as requests for new employment, not reinstatement to 
their old jobs.7 In four situations, however, the replaced striker is treated dif-
ferently than a new applicant The first of these exists when a job opening 
occurs after termination of the strike, and both a former striker and a new ap-
plicant apply for it Although theoretically both stand on the same footing, the 
Board has been quick to draw an inference of discrimination because of union 
activity if, in the absence of extenuating circumstances, the employer should 
2 Other evidence also contributed to the conclusion of the trial examiner. One 
relevant assumption not specifically stated by the report of the case is that some new 
employees had been hired since the application of the strikers. 
a NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 58 S.Ct. 904 (1938). The 
LMRA suggests no distinction between "economic" and "unfair labor practice" strikes. 
On the contrary, from the definition of "employee" in §2(3), and the provision of §13 
that nothing in the act should be construed to interfere with the right to strike, the opposite 
result might be reached. 
4 NLRB v. National Die Casting Co., (7th Cir. 1953) 207 F. (2d) 344. 
5 In addition to the principal case, see Penokee Veneer Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1683 (1947); 
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 27 N.L.R.B. 250 (1940). 
6 Sax v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 769. No application for employment 
is necessary if the employer discharges or threatens to discharge economic strikers because 
of their strike activity before replacing them. Discharge in this situation is a violation of 
§8(a)(3) and reinstatement will be ordered. Duluth Glass Block Store Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 
1064 (1948). And the strikers need not apply if the employer agrees to take the strikers 
back on a preferred basis. Kokomo Sanitary Corp., 26 N.L.R.B. 1 (1940). 
7 American Snuff Co., 109 N.L.R.B. No. 141 (1954). An application for reinstate-
ment is nugatory, since the employee has no right to reinstatement. 
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prefer the new applicant over the experienced striker. 8 The employer has a 
practical burden, not easily dischargeable, to justify his action. The failure of 
the employer to give a reason for his preference is sufficient ground for finding a 
violation.9 Attempts to prove the striker inefficient, physically unfit, or guilty 
of misconduct prior to the strike are viewed by the Board with suspicion, since 
the previous experience of the strikers and the failure of the employer to take 
action before the strike negate these reasons as the only motivating factors in the 
refusal to rehire.10 Unavailability of the strikers at the time of hiring has met 
with more success.11 A comparison of the number of union mex'nbers or strikers 
rehired with the number of non-union members or new employees hired after 
the strike often provides strong evidence of either justification or discrimina-
tion.12 In short, the burden placed on the employer to prove non-discrimina-
tion in this situation is much the same as that placed on him when he refuses 
to reinstate economic strikers who have not been replaced.13 The general 
counsel is required to prove only (I) that the striker applied and was qualified 
for the job, and (2) that a new employee was hired within a reasonable time.14 
8 See the concuning opinion of Board Member Murdock in Union Bus Terminal of 
Dallas, Inc., 98 N.L.R.B. 458 (1952), en£. den. on other grounds (5th Cir. 1954) 211 
F. (2d) 820. 
9 Textile Machine Works, 96 N.L.R.B. 1333 (1951). A spurious reason was also 
given in this case, however. 
10 Union Buffalo Mills Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 384 (1944) (employee had worked for 22 
years with above average pay); Cleveland Worsted Mills Co., 43 N.L.R.B. 545 (1942) 
(superior skill because of more recent employment was presumed although employer had 
hired former employees); Aladdin Industries, Inc., 22 N.L.R.B. 1195 (1940), affd. and 
mod. (7th Cir. 1942) 125 F. (2d) 377, cert. den. 316 U.S. 706, 62 S.Ct. 1310 (1942) 
(proof of inefficiency of each striker held necessary); Republic Steel Corp., 62 N.L.R.B. 
1008 (1945) (employer found to prefer experienced employees). See also Kokomo Sani-
tary Corp., 26 N.L.R.B. 1 (1940) (showing of physical unfitness rejected); Jackson d.b.a. 
Western Printing Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 194 (1941) (drunkenness as an excuse accepted). 
Cf. Penokee Veneer Co., note 5 supra. 
11 Sax d.b.a. Container Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB, note 6 supra; Export Steamship 
Corp., 12 N.L.R.B. 309 (1939). Where the strikers make clear to the employer that their 
requests are continuing applications, the employer may be under a duty to attempt to locate 
them. Sax v. NLRB, note 6 supra; Republic Steel Corp., note 10 supra. 
12 Aladdin Industries, Inc., note 10 supra (employer reemployed higher percentage of 
non-union strikers than union strikers); American Snuff Co., note 7 supra; Anchor Rome 
Mills, 110 N.L.R.B. No. 162 (1954). The employer used this analysis in the principal 
case to justify his actions. 
13 Although it is often stated that non-replaced economic strikers have a right to 
reinstatement after application, the employer may refuse reinstatement if he can show non-
discriminatory motives. National Grinding Wheel Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 905 (1948) (em-
ployer reasonably thought that strikers had obtained work elsewhere); Aldora Mills, 79 
N.L.R.B. 1 (1948) (striker had worked only two days prior to strike, and did not apply 
until ten months after strike). An analogy may also be drawn to the case where an 
employer refuses to rehire laid off employees who have subsequently engaged in concerted 
activities. Prior experience of these employees has been held to justify an inference of 
discrimination. NLRB v. Holtville Ice & Cold Storage Co., (9th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 
168. 
14 NLRB v. Textile Machine Works, Inc., (3d Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 929. This 
was a case where strikers were entitled to reinstatement but had been barred from bringing 
a complaint by the six-month limitation requirement of §lO(b), so they applied as new 
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The principal case seems to increase the quantum of proof required by the 
Board. Although the exact extent of the increased burden is not clear, there is 
an indication that, besides the above factors, some independent evidence of 
discrimination must exist before a violation will be found. The second pitfall 
which an employer may encounter when he refuses to rehire a former striker 
is the requirement that replacements during the strike must be made for business 
reasons as required by NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,15 and not for 
the purpose of discriminating against the strikers. The fact that the replace-
ment was inexperienced has been held to be some evidence of a discriminatory 
replacement.16 The third preference given the replaced striker occurs when 
his replacement quits before the striker applies for his old job. It has been held 
in this situation that the striker's right to full reinstatement is restored as 
though he had never been replaced.17 There is still doubt concerning the 
length of time which the replacement must work before the replaced striker's 
rights are permanently extinguished, but indications are that these rights last for 
a considerable length of time.18 The fourth situation in which permanently 
replaced strikers may obtain an advantage over new employees exists when the 
employer agrees to place them on a preferred hiring list. Violation of this 
agreement has been held discriminatory, even though the strikers do not sub-
sequently apply for work.19 Although the Board in the principal case denied 
that an "agreement to rehire'' has any efficacy in giving the strikers a preferred 
employees. This case, however, has been held identical to that involving replaced economic 
strikers. American Snuff Co., note 7 supra. Seven months after application was held to 
be a reasonable time in the Textile Machine Works case because the application was con-
strued as a continuing one. 
1s 304 U.S. 333, 58 S.Ct. 904 (1938). 
16 Wiltse d.b.a. Ann Arbor Press, 85 N.L.R.B. 58 (1949), enf. as mod. (6th Cir. 
1951) 188 F. (2d) 917. See also Republic Steel Corp., note IO supra. This reasoning 
seems questionable. It would be more logical to infer that the intent of the employer was 
to replace an experienced worker only temporarily where the replacement was inexperi-
enced. It has also been held that where the employer is expanding operations, new em-
ployees hired are presumed to be hired for new jobs opening up and not as replacements 
for strikers. Ohio Ferro-Alloys Corp., 104 N.L.R.B. 542 (1953), en£. den. on other 
grounds (6th Cir. 1954) 213 F. (2d) 646. 
17 Union Bus Terminal of Dallas, Inc., note 8 supra. Combined with the continuing 
application doctrine (see note 11 supra) this may afford the replaced striker a substantial 
advantage over a new applicant. 
18 In Roure-DuPont Mfg. Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 1240 (1951), en£. as mod. (2d Cir. 
1952) 199 F. (2d) 631, the Board indicated that the replaced employee's application might 
still have to be respected, although the case was decided two years after the strike. It 
would seem that the strikers should at least lose their employee status under §2(3) when 
the labor dispute is no longer "current." For an analogous case involving the definition of 
"employee" in representation proceedings, see Standard Insulation Co., 22 N.L.R.B. 758 
(1940). 
19 Kokomo Sanitary Corp., note 6 supra; Rome.DuPont Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, note 18 
supra; Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 845. Compare Sax v. NLRB, 
note 6 supra. If the employer were to agree to hire only new employees who were union 
members, this would certainly be a violation of §8(a)(3). 
896 MmmGAN LAW R.Evmw [ Vol. 53 
status, this case may be distinguished from cases applying the above rule. Here 
the employer agreed only to rehire in a manner not violative of the LMRA, not 
necessarily on a preferred basis. There is little doubt that the principal case 
has lessened the obligations of the employer toward replaced economic strikers 
to some degree. It still remains clear, however, that an employer must be ready 
either to justify a refusal to employ these strikers, or to place them on a pre-
ferred hiring list.20 
David R. Macdonald, S.Ed. 
20 In this connection see J. & H. Clasgens Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 898 (1944). 
